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Fictions in Political Thought
Las Casas, Sepulveda, the Indians, and the Turks 
Tomaž Mastnak
F ictions seem to make political thought work. In this paper,* I will try to substantiate this claim by offering a new interpretation of a (relatively) 
well known episode in the history of European political thought: the dispute 
between Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepülveda over the rights 
of indigenous peoples in the newly discovered America. I will argue that lying 
behind their different stances was a shared conception of what was the »Turk«, 
which structured their response to the Indians. Where Las Casas tried to prove 
that the Indians were not »Turks« and should be treated differently, that is 
peacefully, Sepulveda extended the European attitude towards the Turks to the 
treatment of the Indians.
That the imago Turci underpinned the European debate over the Indians may 
seem surprising. However, in the creation of European identity, the image of 
the »Turk« lay at the core. The mental framework within which Europeans 
related to a new outer world, was -  to a large degree -  shaped by the 
interaction of Medieval Western Christianity with the World of Islam.1 But the 
creation of European identity is not at issue here.2 My point here is rather that 
an intimate link existed, in European imagination, between the two outer 
worlds3 -  the muslim world and what came to be called the Mundo Nuevo -  
and, moreover, that European attitudes towards the »Turks« were at the heart
* The research for this paper was assisted by an award from the Social Science Research Council 
o f  an SSRC-MacArthur Foundation Fellowship on Peace and Security in a Changing World.
1 W hat I have in mind is what we would today call political attitude, not geographical and 
»anthropological« ideas feeding on (often vulgarized) Hellenistic and Roman sources. Cf. Hay, 
Europe; Hodgen, Early Anthropology, Elliott, Spain and Its World.
21 discuss this in Islam and  Creation o f  European Identity.
3 There was also a third world, Africa, from which Las Casas proposed exporting Negro slaves 
to America to spare Indians the heavy labour destroying them. However, the occupation o f 
African lands and islands was originally seen as instrumental for crusading warfare against 
muslims. Cf. Muldoon, Popes, Lawyers, and Infidels, pp. 89 sq., 137 sq.\ Rein, »über 
Bedeutung«, p. 32; Staedler, »Die westindischen Investituredikte«, p. 326.
Fil. vest./A c ta  Phil., X V  (2 /1994), 127-149.
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of their response to the Indians. Twentieth-century discussions of the debate 
over the rights of Indians have tended to overlook this link.
Once we see how much the image of the »Turk« determined the sixteenth- 
century debate over the Indians, it becomes clearer how much our own story of 
the discovery of the New World, overlooking as it does that central, fictious, 
figure of the Turk, continues to be wrapped in fictions. In historians' accounts 
of European debates over the New World, Las Casas and Sepülveda them­
selves often turn into fictions. We have the fiction that their debate was about 
the rights of Indians; the fiction of the discovery of America as the turning 
point in European history and, once again, the fiction that there was no 
imagined Turk in the story. This absent/present fiction is shared by today's 
historians with the sixteenth-century disputants they study -  and is shared by 
our late modern with the early modern world.
In order to approach the question of how fictitous are our past and present 
worlds, and thus to approach the subject of this paper, it may be helpful to see 
how Europeans' view of the world outside was represented in fiction. Let us 
take as a starting point Daniel Defoe, a great master in giving literary expres­
sion to obsessions of his age. One of those obsessions was travel to the known 
and unknown lands. A century and a half after Las Casas and Sepülveda met, 
Defoe published his New Voyage Round the World. Perhaps not surprisingly, 
the novel is an epopee to commerce. At the disposal of Defoe's trading flotilla, 
whose crew is composed of the leading European nations, is nothing less than 
the whole globe. Only gale could prevent these merchants from acquiring 
wealth, not the peoples on shores, »wild, naked, black, barbarous, perfectly 
untractable, and insensible of any state of life being better than their own«.4
Most telling is Defoe's description of the sailing merchants' encounter with the 
Ceylonese. »The people here we found willing to supply us with provisions; 
but withal so sharp, imposing upon us their own rates for everything, [...] that 
we were often provoked to treat them very rudely. However, I gave strict 
orders that they should not be hurt upon any occasion, at least till we had filled 
all our water-casks and taken in what fresh provisions we could get.« How­
ever, the natives were provocative beyond all patience, and the peace was 
finally broken. When a Ceylonese ran away with some fowls that had been 
already sold, two of Defoe's seamen »were so enraged to be so served, that 
they took up their pieces, for they had both fire-arms with them, and fired 
immediately after him, and aimed their shot so well, that though the fellow 
flew like the wind, he shot him through the head, and he dropped down dead 
upon the spot.« And because his fellow countrymen failed to show under­
4 De Foe's Works, Vol. VI, p. 256.
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standing for what had happened, more were killed.5 Political theory could 
hardly present the problem better than this novel from the pen of a great 
ideologist of the new world order. Those writing theoretical fictions ex­
pounded ideas similar to those found in Defoe's New Voyage.
Halfway between Defoe, on the one hand, and Las Casas and Sepulveda, on 
the other, émeric Crucé published his Le nouveau Cynée, a work that occupies 
a prominent place in the canon of European pacifism, and which won its 
author praise as a precusor of liberalism. In this treatise, men travelled, 
communicated, and traded freely across borders. The earth, in Crucé's vision 
of free trade, became one big commonwealth. Yet his commercial cosmopoli­
tanism stumbled over »savages« -  peoples whom he saw as making »no use of 
their reason«. Their mere existence, the author feared, could binder commerce 
and welfare. If they continued to live in their brutish way, they would provoke 
civilized peoples who would, by a general consent, »attack them and kill them 
like wretched beasts in their dens. War against them,« Crucé declared, »will 
always be a good thing if it will not be possible to bring them to reason«. They 
represented a just object of war.6
The sixteenth-century Spanish controversialists did not speak commercial 
language,7 but many of them would also call natives in lands beyond the sea 
wild beasts. These were not abusive words, but concepts. And what they had in 
common with Crucé, the early ideologist of the freedom to trade who did not 
yet feel obliged to hide the warlike face of the »pacific commerce«, was their 
concern with just war. The issue of just war played a key role in searching for 
an answer to the question of how to deal with the peoples Europeans encoun­
tered in the »Age of Discovery«, and it was prominent in both Las Casas' and 
Sepulveda's reasoning.
In what follows, I will first briefly present the controversy between Las Casas 
and Sepulveda, focusing on what I see as the thrust of their arguments. In the 
next section, I will then try to show that the views of these controversialists on
5 Ibid., pp. 257-8.
6Le Nouveau Cynée, pp. 51, 65-7; cf. pp. 33, 35.
7 Vitoria and his pupils addressed the question o f the »right to trade« in the framework o f the ju s  
gentium, under the title o f the »right o f  society and natural communication«. See Pagden, 
»Dispossesssing the barbarians«, p. 86 sq. A different language was spoken by the Genoese 
Capelloni who, soon after the dispute between Las Casas and Sepülveda, in a reflection of direct 
relevance for my subject here, complained that the discovery o f America had been very 
detrimental to the Christians and beneficial to the Turks: »Mais ce qui importe le plus, c'est que 
la plus grande quantité de cet or [brought to Spain from America] court ordinairement es endrois 
ou il y en a le plus. E t cestui là est celui qui iadis estait continuellement porté & puisse encore 
aller en Leuant: Et en fin réduit de tout point au thresor du Turc, sans auoir esperance qu'vn seul 
ducat retourne iamais de en.« Les divers discovrs, pp. 276[b]-277.
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the Indians were shaped by the tradition of thought in which Latin Christendom 
articulated its attitude towards the Muslims.
I. The dispute between Las Casas and Sepulveda
The dispute between Las Casas and Sepulveda can be seen as the culmination 
of the debate in Spain triggered by the discovery of America. The two dispu­
tants presented their views to a junta of learned men, summoned by the 
Emperor Charles V at Valladolid, in 1550-51. The controversy is said to be a 
unique episode in the intellectual history of Europe because »then for the first, 
and doubtless for the last, time a colonizing nation organized a formal enquiry 
into the justice of the methods used to extend its empire«.8 Such an approach 
has been contrasted to the methods employed by other European nations that, 
in their colonial policy, were not troubled by the voice of conscience (»a Las 
Casas did not appear in the French or English colonies in America«), and the 
debate at Valladolid has been interpreted in a broader framework of the 
»Spanish struggle for justice in the conquest of America«.9
The junta of Valladolid, and the two controversalists in particular, were to 
»inquire into and establish the manner and the laws by which our Holy 
Catholic faith can be preached and promulgated in the New World [and to 
examine] in what form those peoples may remain subject to His Majesty the 
Emperor without injury to his royal conscience, according to the bull of Pope 
Alexander.«10 The dispute before the junta  of Valladolid has been character­
ized as a debate over the rights of Indians, yet it was at least as much a debate 
over the emperor's right to a quiet sleep. In this sense, it was a debate over 
what Christians could do with, and to, infidels and pagans and still feel just and 
virtuous: an internal dialogue of Europeans with themselves »in the last 
century of faith and logical reasoning«.11 Yet the debate did not only touch 
upon matters of conscience but also upon questions of faith. Christian Europe 
was divided into bitterly opposed religious camps, and the »over-arching 
concern« of the Spanish debate over the rights of Indians was to refute the 
Lutheran theory of dominium and sovereignty.12 In this, other, sense, the 
Indians were pawns in arguing out the European confessional conflict.
8 Hanke, Aristotle and the American Indians, pp. ix-x.
9Carro, »The Spanish Theological-Juridical Renaissance«, pp. 241 sq., 245-6; Hanke, The 
Spanish Struggle fo r  Justice.
10 Giménez Fernandez, »Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas«, p. 109.
11 »[...] as opposed to 'la Raison'«. Bell, Juan Ginés de Sepulveda, p. xi.
12 Pagden, »Dispossesing the barbarians«, pp. 83, 97.
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The question posed to Las Casas and Sepulveda was phrased clearly and 
precisely; neither of them questioned the framework in which they were to 
argue. Their suggested solutions to the problem, however -  if we stay within 
the dominant interpretation of the debate -  were diametrically opposed. Las 
Casas, who had a conversion experience in the Indies and entered the Domini­
can order, has aquired the reputation of a great defender of the Indians because 
he was resolutely opposed to the use of violence against the indigenous 
peoples in the newly discovered world. He passionately denounced the con­
quistadores' attrocities and cruelty of the encomienda system; held the Indians 
to be civilized and rational beings; and contended that only the peaceful, 
nonviolent, spread of Christianity was just and permissible. Sepulveda, a 
notable scholar of his time and a translator of Aristotle, is understood to have 
applied the philosopher's theory of natural slavery to the Indians. Because of 
their depravity of reason and civilization, he is said to have argued, it was right 
that the Indians be governed by those who were by nature their superiors, i.e., 
the Spaniards. He is furthermore said to have argued that should the Indians 
refuse to submit to Spanish rule and continue to live in their brutish ways, 
sinning against nature, it would be just to wage war against them and to subdue 
them by force.13
Such an interpretation has constructed the figure of Sepülveda as the one who 
»stepped forward to give comfort to Spanish officials and conquistadores by 
proclaiming the conquest just«; while Las Casas becomes »an apostle who 
burned with a fierce zeal on behalf of those newly discovered Indians and who 
defended them with all the weapons at his disposal«.14 But such a simplifying 
interpretation has also created problems: its predominantly moralistic charac­
ter has often diverted discussion away from analysis of the main characters' 
theoretical positions.
On the one hand, Las Casas' deserved reputation of a Human Rights Watch 
activist avant la lettre has obscured the theoretical dimension of his work; it 
has had to be stressed that he should also be considered »a political thinker«.15 
Sepülveda, on the other hand, was a renowned scholar, but one involved in 
political controversy. And while engagement in vivere politico is to be ex­
pected of a good humanist, perhaps it was his involvement with what has 
become the wrong side that cast a shadow not only over him but also over what
13 See, for example, Hanke, Aristotle; and Skinner, The Foundations, Vol. 2, pp. 142, 168 sq. A 
good summary o f  the dispute, not neglecting theoretical arguments involved: Losada, »The 
Controversy«, and »Introduction« to Sepülveda/Las Casas, Apologia’, the official summary o f 
the dispute: Soto, »Controversia«.
14 Hanke, The Spanish Struggle, pp. 114, 155.
15 Ibid., p. 153.
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he actually said.16 Thus, in short, we need to look closer at the arguments of 
both Las Casas and Sepulveda.
If we first define Sepülveda's theoretical position per negationem, he was not 
an Erasmian. His polemics with Erasmus -  which gave occasion to portray 
Sepulveda as a defender of »scholasticism, dialectics, of all that which the 
Erasmian wit had scorned as sheer logomachy«17 -  is of no immediate interest 
here. What is relevant is the popular understanding of Erasmianism as uncom­
promisingly rejecting war.18 It is in this context that Las Casas can be seen as a 
»genuine Spanish Erasmian«,19 and Sepülveda's argument in De convenientia 
militaris disciplinae cum Christiana religione dialogus qui inscribitur 
Democrates -  that military profession and Christianity are not exclusive of 
each other and that Christians are allowed to wage war -  as running contrary to 
Erasmian irenism.20 Erasmians did not respond to Sepulveda's challenge, and 
the argument itself put forward in Democrates had by then had a long life in 
the Christian doctrine, yet Sepulveda nevertheless felt he had to defend his 
position. That defence, Democrates alter (followed by Apologia), already 
belonged to the Valladolid controversy.
Sepülveda's views on war were of obvious relevance for the »Indian ques­
tion«. Describing these views simply as an attempt to legitimize either the 
ethics of martial society, or the military spirit then already in retreat before 
commerce; or as an apology of one of the »aspectos del vivir hispânico« (with 
arms in the noble hands),21 looses sight of this relevance. A much more 
promising approach is to see Sepülveda in the framework of classical human­
ism.22
Sepülveda's central concern was vita activa. He brought »the moral virtues 
fully within the social and political order inseparable from the civitas' scope«, 
and »possibly the single most constant feature of Sepülveda's thought« was the 
relevance he ascribed to the laws, »the truest backbone of any common­
16 Losada, »Introduction« to Sepulveda, Democrates segundo, p. xvi, has argued that Las Casas' 
(and his partisans') »machinations« silenced Sepulveda's voice; and Bell, op. cit., wrote »an 
apology [...] longoverdue to agreat man too often misunderstood and misinterpreted«. (But Las 
Casas, too, has been defended against his »detractors«: Comas, »Historical Reality«.)
17 Bataillon, Erasme et l ’Espagne, Vol. 1, p. 442.
18 For a critique o f  such view, see my Islam.
19 Losada, »Introduction« to Apologia, p. 26.
20 Bataillon, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 254-5, has pointed out that the words Sepülveda, in Democrates 
alter, put into the mouth of Leopoldus, the literary adversary, were reminiscent o f  Querela 
p a d s.
21 Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 673, Vol. 2, p. 254; Hanke, Aristotle, pp. 13 sq., 128-9, n. 6.
22 Fermndez-Santamaria, The State, War and Peace, Ch. 7.
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wealth«. As the law common to all men he understood natural law, constituted 
by recta ratio, acceptance of duty, and the obligations of virtue.23 The light of 
right reason enabled the good man to discern what was good and just, from 
what is evil and unjust. This Sepülveda held true not only of the Christian but 
of everyone who had not corruptued rectam naturam with depraved, perverse 
behaviour.24 Thus Sepülveda contained that »if the governance of a republic is 
to remain healthy it must take care not to exclude from its midst any form of 
natural law. To do otherwise would be barbaric and contrary to that human 
nature which is held in high esteem precisely because of its reasoning pow­
ers.«25
These principles were the basis on which Sepülveda passed his judgement on 
the vita activa of the Indians. He found the life of the American natives 
»savage«, »comparable to that of the beasts«; he castigated, as »crimes damned 
by natural law«, human sacrifice (»their execrable and prodigious immolations 
of human victims to demons«), cannibalism, and »the custom of burying alive 
the wives of prominent men with their dead husbands«.26 And because the 
Indians violated the law of nature, the Spanish humanist doubted their ratio­
nality. However, what Sepülveda judged were institutions; what he passed his 
judgement on was what we could call Indian polities. »Seeking to dispel 
possible doubts that he may have been influenced by religious considerations 
Sepülveda is at pains to stress that he is evaluating the vita activa of the 
Indians and not judging their spiritual shortcomings. Thus he points out that 
the natives' paganism is not the reason why they must be ruled by the Span­
iards.«27 The ground for the Spanish claim for imperium over America was the 
civic deprivation of the Indians, their lack of civility. The proto-civility of the 
Indians implied that they were »in a state of improvable backwardness«,28 that 
they were perfectable, and humanism inspired -  or sought to inspire -  the 
Spaniards with the care for the welfare of those barbarians.
Because Sepülveda saw reason as the sine qua non of civility -  while the 
possession of Christian truth was not »a prerequisite to the emergence of 
sound political institutions«29 -  the American natives should, under the Span­
ish parental guidance, be led out of their sinful condition into civic existence 
based on reason and obedience to natural law. The humanist imperial program
25 Ibid., pp. 196-8.
24 Democrates segundo, pp. 11-12.
25 Sepülveda, De regno, quoted in Fernândez-Santamaria, op. cit., p. 197.
26 De regno, quoted ibid., p. 202.
27 Fernândez-Santamaria, op. cit., p. 202-3.
28 Losada, »Controversy«, p. 287.
29 Fernândez-Santamaria, op. cit., p. 209.
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was civic education. Barbaras et inhumanas gentes should be for their own 
good subjected to the rule of more humane and virtuous nations or princes, so 
that by the latter's example of virtue, laws, and prudence; they could be taught 
to embrace a more humane life, milder manners, and to cultivate virtue.30
Should the barbarians, whose natural condition demanded that they obey those 
embodying civic perfection, reject the magnanimity of the Spanish kings who 
did not want to punish their sins but desired their correction (emendatio), 
salvation and public well-being;31 war could be justly waged against them. 
»By means of a just war we also seek to establish imperium over those after 
whose welfare we care, so that the barbarians -  once deprived of their license 
for sinning, their customs contrary to natural law uprooted, exhorted toward a 
more humane way of life through a civil form of government -  be kept 
reasonably within the boundaries of their duties.«32
Las Casas -  if we do not overlook that »under the fire and brimstone of his 
sulphurous invective lay a closely reasoned structure of thought based upon 
the most fundamental political concepts of medieval Europe«33 -  differed from 
Sepülveda in that he predominantly based his arguments in defence of the 
Indians from the violence of the conquista on the ecclesiastical legal tradition. 
He »marshalled a corps of medieval jurists to march for his cause«.34 But he 
did not defend the Indians from the Spanish imperium over them. Like 
Sepülveda, he did not question the right of the Spaniards' imperial presence in 
America. When Las Casas came to consider the justice of Spanish title over 
American lands, the central authority he referred to was donatio Alexandri, 
Pope Alexander Vi's bull that invested Spain with imperium over America. 
For him, it was in papal bulls where the supreme and fundamental reason for 
Spain's imperial enterprise in America was to be found.35 In his view, »[t]he 
kings of Castille and Leon have the most just title to imperial and universal 
sovereignty over the whole world of what is called the Indian Ocean and are 
justly sovereign and supreme princes, and universal lords and emperors over
30 Democratessegundo, p. 22. Fernândez-Santamaria refutes the thesis that Sepülveda advocated 
natural servitude for the American natives, and argues instead that the form of government he 
recommended for the natives of the New World »does not significantly depart from that 
recommended for the mass o f the population in the Old«; and Sepülveda's ideal imperial agents 
were men »modeling their lives after the Ciceronian ideal o f  public service«. Op. cit., pp. 234, 
233.
31 Democrates segundo, p. 43.
32 De regno, quoted in Fernândez-Santamaria, op. cit., p. 218.
33 Hanke, The Spanish Struggle, p. 153.
34 Pennington, The Prince and the Law, p. 272. But Pagden has called Las Casas' defence o f  the 
Amerindian peoples »quasi-legal tracts«. European Encounters, p. 56.
35 Cairo, op. cit., p. 271.
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the natural kings and lords thereof, by virtue of authority, grant and donation 
[...] of the apostolic Holy See [...]. And this, and nothing else, is the juridical 
and substantial foundation upon which rests and is placed this title in its 
entirety.«36
In Las Casas' opinion, the Spanish crown had no legal ground to claim 
dominium rerum in America, but it had the right to dominium jurisdictionis,37 
Accepting and justifiying Spain's sovereignty over the Indians, Las Casas 
strove to make the Spanish imperium as good and humane as possible.38 He 
argued for imperialism with a human face. Taking seriously the noble idea of 
the Spanish kingdom (as expressed, for example, in the testament of Queen 
Isabella and in royal cédulas), he wished to purge the conquista of the evils 
that were done, he believed, against the will of the monarchs and their 
legislation. He was convinced that the principal aim of Spanish presence in 
America -  the spread of the true faith, »la predicaciön y plantaciôn de la sancta 
fe« -  could be, and could only be, achieved with peaceful methods. His 
conviction was also that Spanish imperial sovereignty over the newly discov­
ered lands was not detrimental to the rights and freedom of the Indians and 
their princes, »who could govern themselves as long as they complied with 
their duties and did not hinder the missionaries and the Indians' conversion or 
practice of the Christian religion«.39 The acceptance of the Spanish King as 
their universal senor would make it possible for the Indians »to cleanse away 
the defects from which their commonwealths suffer, that they might enjoy a 
better liberty«.40
Thus cleansing away evil did not apply to the conquerors only, but to the 
conquered as well. And Las Casas' view of the conquered -  framed in the 
admired declaration that »mankind is one, and all men are alike in that which 
concerns their creation and all natural things«41 -  was that »the savage peoples 
of the earth may be compared to uncultivated soil that readily brings forth
36 Las Casas, »Tratado comprobatorio«, p. 352. On key categories -  auctoridad, concesiôn and 
donaciôn -  see Staedler, op. cit., p. 322.
37 See Pagden, Spanish Imperialism, pp. 13-36; Pennington, op. cit., p. 273.
38 »Far from seeking to remove Spain and her kings’ sovereignty from the New World, [...] Las 
Casas wished to improve the work o f Spain to make it a greater work o f unique grandeur«. 
Carro, op. cit., p. 273.
39 Ibid., pp. 274-5.
411 Ibid., p. 274; Las Casas, »E! octavo remedio«, p. 93.
41 Hanke, citing Las Casas' Apologética historia, sees here his author »at his best«. Aristotle, p. 
112. »Las Casas, in his bid to make the Indians familiar to his European reader, tries to erase 
difference and create a suitable natural and human environment for Cicero's 'republic o f all the 
world'.« Pagden, European Encounters, p. 59.
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weeds and useless thorns, but has within itself such natural virtue that by 
labour and cultivation it may be made to yield sound and beneficial fruits«.42
Las Casas' imperialism is usually seen as benign because he rejected the 
empire of conquest for empire of conversion.43 But his metaphor comparing 
the »savage peoples« to uncultivated soil represents the Indians as even more 
passive than in Sepülveda's argument. In contrast to the latter's civic education 
design, what we have here is a cultivation project: instead of education, 
cultura; instead of parental guidance, tilling the uncultivated mind.
Las Casas was as arrogant as Sepülveda in his belief that the Spaniards and, 
generally, Christians, were »on the path of truth«.44 At an early stage in his 
career he proclaimed as »the basic concept which was to guide all his action on 
behalf of the Indians«,45 that »[o]ur Christian relation is suitable for and may 
be adapted to all the nations of the world, and all like may receive it«.46 On 
declaratory level, plantation of the true faith, as Las Casas made it clear time 
and again, excludes violence. If the argument behind Sepülveda's civic educa­
tion was the sword, what pertained to Las Casas' cultivation was the symbol of 
peace, ploughshares. But ploughshares can easily be beaten into swords,47 and 
even Las Casas himself envisaged the Spaniards in America building for­
tresses and argued that a limited number of soldiers should remain there to 
protect the missionaries.48
The Spanish debate over the »rights of the Indians«, it has been argued, was 
not provoked »solely by intellectual or moral disquiet but by peremptory need 
to organize -  politically, socially, and economically -  the new colonial em­
pire«.49 How much the two disputants served those pragmatic needs is difficult 
to ascertain. Las Casas is said to have influenced the spirit of the basic law of 
15 73,50 that proscribed the word »conquest« and replaced it with the politically
42 Apologética historia, quoted by Hanke, ibid.
43 Hirst, »The evolution of consciousness«, p. 62.
44 The phrasing is pope Innocent IV's, denying to the Muslims the right, which he claimed for the 
Christians, to preach the faith among non-beliveres: »cum ipsi sint in errore et nos in via 
veritatis«. Apparatus to X 3.34.8, in Appendix to Kedar, Crusade and Mission, p. 217.
45 Hanke, Aristotle, p. 17.
46 Quoted ibid.
47 Cf. The oration o f cardinal Bessarion, the humanist pope Pius II's aide, a  century before the 
Valladolid dispute: »Now those who blaspheme against the Holy Ghost and commit the 
unforgivable sin o f  denying by word and sign that Christ is the Son o f God must be punished 
by God's right hand, Now ploughshares must be beaten into swords, now the tunic must be sold 
and the sword bought [...].« Piccolomini, The Commentaries, book VIII, p. 539.
48 Carro, op. cit., p. 275; Pagden, »Dispossesing the barbarians«, p. 96.
45 Friede, »Las Casas and Indigenism«, p. 129.
50 Hanke, Aristotle, p. 86.
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correct »pacification«. How much such laws determined the behaviour of the 
Spaniards in America is another question. Yet as ideas, Las Casas' humanitari- 
anism and Sepülveda's humanism would have had equally devastating effects 
on the indigenous population if put into practice.51 They expressed the funda­
mental attitude of what was by then Europe, towards the world outside popu­
lated by infidels and pagans. I will now turn to the question of how Las Casas 
and Sepülveda related to the intellectual tradition in which this attitude had 
been elaborated.
II. The Indians and the Turks
Intellectual life in the sixteenth-century Spain was dominated by the Spanish 
theological and juridical renaissance. Las Casas and Sepülveda are usually 
discussed in the context of this renaissance, with some commentators ques­
tioning how representative they were of that intellectual milieu. Thus, for 
example, it has been argued that »Las Casas was not the central figure of the 
tradition in question, and indeed lacked the standing to be such«; and that 
Sepülveda represented »the old European ideology, superseded in Spain by 
men like Francisco de Vitoria and Domingo de Soto«.52
Such qualifications may help us to better understand Las Casas and Sepülveda. 
But it is misleading to see Sepülveda as »ill advisedly« entering an »alien 
field« and arguing »alien ideas that he simply borrowed from the old Eu­
rope«.53 On the one hand, the theologico-juridical renaissance in Spain (to 
which Sepülveda was indeed alien) was itself rooted in medieval intellectual 
traditions: it is only the stress historians have laid on what was -  or seemed -  
new in that renaissance that have disappeared its medieval lineage from our 
sight. On the other hand, Las Casas and Sepülveda themselves extensively 
referred to, and embedded their arguments within, doctrines and ideas of 
medieval Europe.54 They both quoted, in support of their disparate positions, 
Pope Alexander Vi's bull Inter caetera;5S thus invoking a tradition running 
back to the eleventh century.56 They backed their arguments with the auctoritas
51 Menéndez Pidal characterized the Valladolid controversy as the struggle between the humani- 
tarianism o f  Las Casas and the humanism o f Sepulveda. Hanke, Aristotle, p. 95. (More than four 
centuries later, Serbian humanists designed a war o f conquest against Bosnia; and Serbia's 
Western allies are waging humanitarian aid against the unfortunate country.)
52 Carro, op. cit., p. 247.
53 Ibid.
54 »Las Casas exploited a tradition supporting his contention in the writings o f medieval jurists 
that stretched back to the thirteenth century.« Pennington, op. cit., p. 272.
55 See Staedler, op. cit.', Muldoon, op. cit., p. 137 sq.
56 »Las Bulas Alejandrinas de Partition, de 1493, constituyen una de las ultimas aplicaciones
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of pope Innocent IV and Hostiensis, not to speak of lesser figures central to the 
development of Christian doctrine regarding the non-Christians. In short, the 
Valladolid disputants did not borrow »alien ideas« from »the old Europe«. 
Rather, the three centuries from Innocent IV and the Spanish debates over the 
Indians »formed a coherent period in the development of European attitudes 
toward non-Europeans«.57 Those ideas were not »alien« to the world in which 
Las Casas and Sepülveda lived; and the discovery of a new world did not 
simply turn the medieval Europe into »the old Europe«. The opposite was, 
rather, true: there was a prominent presence of the middle ages in the conquest 
of America.58
The basic structure of the argument regarding the extra-European worlds and 
peoples, canonically formulated in the mid-thirteenth century, was not shaken 
by the discovery of America. The discovery was not a break with the past. The 
immediate impact of the descumbrimiento on Europe was all but revolutioniz­
ing. Elliott has convincingly argued that, »at least so far as fundamental 
political transformations are concerned« -  »[t]he refusal of states to accept the 
continuance of any form of subordination to a supra-national ecclesiastical 
authority; the absolutist tendencies of sixteenth-century princes; the develop­
ment of new theories and practices to regulate relations between independent 
sovereign states -  all these developments are entirely conceivable in a Europe 
which remained in total ignorance of the existence of America.«59
It appears to me that the idea of the centrality of discovery of America for 
European history is less a result of the discovery itself than a product of the 
rise of the »Atlantic World« and its dominance over the globe, sealed by the 
American and French revolutions. The centrality of the discovery of America 
was a work of interpreters -  among whom historians played a key role -  not 
discoverers and conquerors. Francisco Lopez de Gömara's statement, offered 
up to the Emperor Charles in the dedication to his Hispania victrix (1552), that 
the discovery of America had been the greatest event since the creation of the 
world (save the incarnation of God),60 was merely the opening peal of the 
history workshop accompanying the formation of the Atlantic-centred world.
prâcticas de una vieja y extrana teoria juridica, elaborada explicitamente en la corte pontificia 
a fines del siglo XI [...] conforme a la cual todas las islas pertenecen a la especial jurisdiction 
de San Pedro y de sus sucesores, los pontifices romanos, quiénes pueden libremente disponer 
de ellas.« Weckmann, Las Bulas, pp. 32-3.
57 Muldoon, op. cit., p. 153.
58 Weckmann, »The Middle Ages in the Conquest o f  America«.
59 The O ld World and the New, p. 79; cf. Spain and Its World, Part I.
60 »Muy soberano Senor: La mayor cosa después de la creation del mundo, sacando la 
encamacion y muerte del que lo criö, es el descubrimiento de Indias.« Quoted in Hanke, 
Aristotle, p. 124 n. 7; cf. Pagden, European Encounters, Ch. 3.
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A history workshop that dumped European history upon Others who had no 
reason to be concerned with it, but were used by Europeans to construct an 
encounter with themselves.61 (To what avail is not at issue here.)
When Las Casas and Sepülveda exchanged arguments in Valladolid, America 
was still of little interest to Europe. European history, as European history 
(that is, the self-awareness of that new collective entity that had succeeded the 
respublica Christiana), was at its core a history of imaginary and real warfare 
against Islam. What Europe, then, was far more interested in than America, 
was the Orient, the Muslim world, the representation of which had become the 
»Turk«. Far from being a break with that history, the discovery of America 
was caught into its symbolic nets. In more than one sense, the discovery was 
»an indirect byproduct of the crusading movement«,62 and the argument that 
the fall of Constantinople is to be seen as a more decisive »turning point« in 
European history than the discovery of America, is not to be too easily 
dismissed.63 The results of Atkinson's study of the sixteenth-century French 
literature may be seen as indicative not only for France. The study showed that 
there were far more books published on the Turks, and also on the East Indies 
and Asia, than on America; that there were twice as many publications on the 
Turks as on the New World; and four times as many books devoted to the 
Turks and Asia, than to America.64 However, for my argument here, this is 
circumstantial evidence.
Closer to my subject is the evidence of how much the conquista was seen, also 
from within, as a continuation of the reconquista,65 That Spain had been »the 
land of perennial crusading« was not inconsequential.66 And because the
61 »[T]here is a real sense in which the most important encounter made by Europeans in the age 
o f Enlightenment was the encounter with themselves, with their pasts and with their own 
historicity, so that it was into these highly sophisticated and even self-critical schemes of 
historiography that they sought to integrate, or gave up trying to integrate, the cultures with 
whom they came in contact. The Others found all the problems o f European history dumped 
upon them [...].« Pocock, »Nature and History«, p. 8.
62 Atiya, Crusade, p. 128. Cf. Villey, La croisade, p. 265: »Qui sait dans quelle mesure la notion 
de croisade n'éclairerait pas l'histoire d'Espagne, jusqu'à une époque tardive, y compris celle 
des Grandes Découvertes?«
63 For example, Toffanin, »Introduzione«, p. ix. But already the occupation of Jerusalem by the 
crusaders was glorified in words very similar to Gömara's (see n. 60): »But apart from the 
mistery o f the healing cross, what more marvelous deed has there been since the creation of the 
world than that which was done in modern times in this journey of our men of Jerusalem?« I 
quote Riley-Smith's translation o f Robert the Monk, Historia Iherosolimitana, in The First 
Crusade, p. 140.
“ Atkinson, Les nouveaux horizons, pp. 10-11. Cf., especially, Göllner, Tvrcica, Vol. Ill; 
Rouillard, The Turk, also Elliott, The Old World, p. 12; Hanke, Aristotle, p. 2.
6f Muldoon, op. cit., pp. 137, 152; Hirst, op. cit. p. 53.
66 Weckmann, »The Middle Ages«, p. 130.
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reconquista had often been perceived as an integral part of the great enterprise 
of the »recovery of the Holy Land«,67 it is not surprising that Columbus, when 
he discovered the earthly Paradise, estimated the grandeur of the wealth there 
with eyes turned back East: as big enough to finance a huge army which could 
retake possession of the Holy Sepulchre.68 The conquistadores self-consciously 
and explicitly acted out heroisms of El Cid; they were helped by crusading 
saints; and in their celebrations in New Spain they knew to stage the siege of 
Rhodes by the Turks.69 Yet the point I want to make is that the »Turks« 
functioned as an organizing principle in the internal economy of Las Casas' 
and Sepulveda's reasoning.
In 1529, Sepülveda wrote a small treatise addressed to Charles V, exhorting 
the Emperor to wage war against the Turks. He deplored Turkish tyranny70 and 
argued that war against the Turks was an indisputable example of just war. 
Compared to this war, all other wars in which Christians were engaged, paled: 
»It is neither glory nor wealth that is at stake here but fatherland, home, liberty, 
salvation, and religion«.71 And as already the title shows, Ad Carolum V ... ut 
fac'a cum omnibus Christianis pace bellum suscipiat in turcas, Sepülveda 
firmly anchored his Cohortatio in the ideological matrix that had by then long 
been the European spiritual common good: that peace had to be made within 
Christianity so that Christians could go to war against the Turks.72 Democrates 
primus, written a few years later, was Sepülveda’s response to a student protest 
that he had witnessed when visiting the Colegio de San Clemente, an elite 
Spanish school in Bologna where he himself had studied. At a time when 
Spain was at war with the Turks, the students claimed that »all war, including 
defensive war, is contrary to the Catholic religion«.73 Sepülveda, in his first 
Democrates, refuted this, to his mind, scandalous opinion. The views he 
formulated in this context he would later, in Democrates alter, apply to the 
Indian question, extending the treatment that Europeans and their Christian 
republican predecessors had conceived for the Muslims, to the Amerindians. 
There is no doubt, as an expert has concluded, that Sepülveda »used the
67 See Villey, op. cit., p. 193 sq., especially p. 199, on the reconquista seen as »une seconde 
marche vers Jérusalem«.
68 Weckmann, »The Middle Ages«, p. 132. »Columbus him self was deeply rooted [...] in the 
medieval crusading tradition.« Muldoon, op. cit., p. 136.
69 Pagden, European Encounters, pp. 78-9, cf. 62; Weckmann, »The Middle Ages«, pp. 133-4. 
711 »Sepülveda, unacquainted with the ways o f modern income taxation, considered this an
intolerable tyranny: '0  novum genus tyrannidis et prioribus saeculis apud humaniores gentes 
inauditum! 0  avaritiam intolerabilem!'« Bell, op. cit., pp. 8-9.
71 Fernândez-Santamaria, op. cit., pp. 219-20.
72 See Mastnak, op. cit.
73 Losada, »Controversy«, p. 281.
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arguments for the war against the Turks to justify the war against the Indi­
ans.«74
Las Casas' argumentative strategy was less linear. While sharing basic pre­
mises with Sepülveda, he desired to get to the opposite conclusion. He held the 
same views of the Turks as did his adversary, but unlike him he claimed that 
the Indians were not »Turks« and should therefore not be treated like Turks. 
The construction of difference between the Muslims and the natives of America 
was the axis of his reasoning, and if one speaks of his love for the Indians, one 
should also speak of his hatred of the Turks. Indeed, his love for the former fed 
on his hatred of the latter.
It has been argued that Las Casas, in his insistance on the difference between 
the Indians and the Turks, was more typical of Spanish political discourse of 
the age than Sepülveda; that the Spaniards' attitude towards the American 
Indians looked »remarkably mild« compared to their attitude towards other 
non-Christians known to them;75 and that it was »fortunate for the Indians that 
Las Casas, along with Francisco de Vitoria and Domingo de Soto, emphasized 
the great distinction between wars against the Indians and those against the 
Moors and Turks«.76 Given the prominence of the just war theory in those 
times, the fundamental distinction between wars was that between just and 
unjust wars. Because a necessary condition of a just war was that it be 
conducted by legitimate authority,77 the nature of Christian wars against non- 
Christians depended not only on crimes of which non-Christians were deemed 
guilty and could be considered just causes of war; but also on whether 
Christian rulers could claim legal authority over particular non-Christians. Las 
Casas' desire was to prove that just war could not be waged against the 
American Indians. Thus he had to demonstrate that the Indians were to be 
exempted from those cases in which the Church and Christian princes thought 
that they could claim juridical authority over non-Christians.
Las Casas assertion was that the Church gives all hope of salvation, and that, in 
this sense, »all the infidels hope for the Church's power of exercising jurisdic­
tion, but in a very different way, depending on their genus or species«. He also
74 Ibid., p. 301.
75 With regard to the »hate speech«, the Laws o f Burgos (1512) forbade that an Indian be called 
perro  (dog), but another curse, perro moro (Moorish dog) seems not to have been proscribed. 
(Cf. Hanke, Aristotle, p. 15.)
76 Ibid., p. 107. He should have added the persecution of the Jews. The year o f the discovery of 
America was also the year o f  the fall o f Granada, followed by the expulsion of Moors and Jews, 
so that a  decade later Spain was religiously cleansed. Cf. Shannon, Visions, p. 12.
77 »The most crucial issue in any just war theory is the locus o f authority capable of waging war.« 
Russell, The Just War, p. 68.
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made it clear, however, that the Church did not exercise jurisdiction over all 
infidels.78 Following this leading idea, Las Casas classified infidels into, 
firstly, those who lived under, and were subjects of, Christian princes, such as 
the Jews and the Moors; secondly, those who lived in kingdoms subjected to 
infidel princes, such as the Moors, Turks, Scythians, Persians and Indians; 
and, thirdly, heretics. The first and the third class, he argued, were under 
Christian jurisdiction,79 but not the second. Consequently, neither Church nor 
Christian princes might castigate pagans living under their infidel princes for 
their idolatry and crimes, because Christian rulers did not have juridical 
authority over them.80
Las Casas then constructed another tripartite classification to consider excep­
tions to the rule that where the Church had no jurisdiction over infidels it had 
no right to punish. In two out of these three classes the Church had jurisdiction 
over infidels, yet of a different nature. The first class of this scheme were those 
infidels who lived and worked within Christendom and were therefore »sub­
jects of the Church or of a member of the Church, for example, of a Christian 
prince«.81 Over them, the Church had actual legal authority, but not over the 
third class that fell under the title of »voluntary jurisdiction« -  the jurisdiction, 
that is, which could not be exercised over any person against his will. Such 
was the jurisdiction of the pope, the vicar of Christ, whose mission was to 
preach gospel to all the people of the world. This jurisdiction was voluntary 
because no one could be compelled by the Roman pontif to accept the faith; 
they could only peacefully and gracefully be exhorted and invited to accept 
it.82 This third class could be easily translated -  with far reaching conse­
quences -  into jus gentium, with the right to travel, jus peregrinandi, and the 
right to preach, jus praedicandi, as central tenets.83 Yet this is another subject. 
Of interest here are exceptions to the second class. To this class belonged the 
infidels who were not under Christian authority but over whom (as Las Casas 
claimed) the Church could exceptionally assume jurisdiction, which was al­
most synonymous with the right to make war.
Las Casas divided these exceptions into six cases: First, when infidels pos­
sessed dominions that they had unjustly taken from Christian peoples, espe-
78 Apologia, pp. 229-30. In original, fol. 1 lOv: »Omnes ergo cuius generis aut species existant 
infideles ad judicium spectant ecclesiae: sed multum differenter. [...] non omnes infideles esse 
de ecclesiae judicia vim potestate.«
19 Ibid., pp. 145-6.
80 Ibid., pp. 158, 164, 182.
81 Ibid., p. 192.
82 Ibid., p. 306.
81 Cf. Pagden, Spanish Imperialism, p. 21 sq.
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daily if Christians still lived in those territories. Second, when pagans prac­
tised idolatry in provinces that had been in former times under Christian 
jurisdiction, and (in Las Casas' words) infested with their nefarious and abomi­
nable vices regions which had been consecrated by the sacrifice and blood of 
Christ; where the true God had been worshiped and sacred sacraments 
administred.84 Third, when infidels blasphemed against Christ or saints, or 
consciously spoke maliciously and contemptously, with hatred and scorn, 
against the Christian truth.85 Fourth, when pagans hindered the propagation of 
the faith »de per se« and not »per accidens«, and with word or deed attacked 
those who wished to embrace, or had embraced, the faith; and when they 
understood what was preached to them and still mistreated the preachers.86 
Fifth, when infidels with their armies invaded Christian provinces or infested 
Christian littoral, and in great numbers, like the Turks, molested, attacked and 
troubled Christendom, or, like Saracens, made frequent incursions into Chris­
tian territory.87 Sixth, when infidels unjustly oppressed innocent persons, the 
Church had the right to exercise coercive jurisdiction to liberate the victims.88
The careful formulation of these exceptions made it relatively easy to prove 
that Christians had no right to make war on the Indians. The first and the 
second case were an obvious description of the situation in the Holy Land, as 
seen through European eyes. The infidels Las Casas had in mind in the third 
case were Jews and Saracens, whom he saw as blaspheming Jesus Christ with 
the intention of preventing the acceptance, and impeding the spread, of the 
Christian faith. The fourth case, like the third, was an infringement of the right 
to preach. But while the Muslims were supposed to know what was preached 
to them,89 their assumed ignorance saved the Indians from Christian coercion. 
While the fifth case left no doubt about Indian innocence, it took some 
ingenuity for Las Casas to prove his sixth case: that the notorious Indian 
human sacrifices did not constitute just cause for war against them.
Las Casas' demonstration that war against the Indians was illicit rested on his 
belliciosity against the Turks, Moors and Saracens. It has been pointed out that 
he was »in no sense a pacifist«, because he considered some wars just: those,
84 Apologia, pp. 193-5.
85/Ш ., pp. 230-1.
“  Ibid., pp. 232, 234.
87 Ibid., p. 244.
1,8 Ibid., p. 247 sq.
89 That was not a completely groundless supposition, for »Oriental studies«, as maid servants o f 
the recuperatione Terrae Sanctae enterprise, had been by then more than two centuries old -  
if  we accept that Ramon Llull was their »father« (Atiya, The Crusade, p. 86). But see Smith, 
Christians and Moors, Vol. II, p. 60 sq., on the study o f Arabic in the thirteenth century.
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for example, against Mohammedans and heretics.90 But only common sense 
sees a contradiction between belliciosity and pacifism. Las Casas was a 
spokesman of a world that uses war and peace as alternate means of subjecting 
Others. Why he chose peace for the Indians is a question I will not try to 
answer here; my point is that he could argue for peaceful treatment of the 
Indians because he accepted the justice of war against the Muslims.
In Las Casas' views of the Mulsims, we can discern a mentality hostile to the 
»Turks« that he shared with his world, and a formal expression of that 
mentality that was all his own. On the one hand, Las Casas did not spare 
invectives when talking of Muslims whose impiety was, in his and his contem­
poraries' opinion, adverse to divine and natural law.91 He also used the Muslim 
name as invective, for example, when he charged Sepülveda with the desire to 
spread the faith with »Mohammedan method«, that is, »with death and ter­
ror«.92 (But he did not shrink from authorizing the use of methods he called 
Mohammedan against the Mohammedans themselves.) There is nothing sur­
prising about this. This mentality, not specific to Las Casas, simply provided 
substance to the formal structure of his argument.
His argument, on the other hand, is surprising. On the road to proving that just 
war could not be conducted against the Indians, Las Casas ended up with a 
general rejection of the idea of conquest as such. He postulated that »there 
should be no talk of conquest, as if the Indians were African Moors or Turks, 
but only the preaching of the gospel of Christ 'with gentle and divine words'«.93 
He argued that the very term conquest was »tyrannical, Mohammedan, abu­
sive, improper and infernal« and that, consequently, conquest could be con­
ducted only against »Moors from Africa, Turks, and heretics who seize our 
lands, persecute Christians and work for the destruction of our faith«.94 For the 
argument to stand, it had to be backed by a formal authority. What is surprising 
is that Las Casas chose, in support of his vindication of the rights of the 
Indians, an auctoritas who denied that infidels had any rights at all.
The legal question central to the Church doctrine regarding infidels was 
whether they possessed the right to lordship and property -  that is, whether 
they were rightful owners of the lands they inhabited and whether they could
90 Losada, »Controversy«, p. 283, who is happy to note that, with regard to the Muslims, Las Casas 
agreed with Sepulveda (p. 293).
91 Apologia, pp. 222, 231, 353
92 Ibid., pp. 338, 342. Hanke, Aristotle, p. 91, called attention to Franciscan Juan de Silva who 
»argued, like Las Casas before him, that preaching the faith under the protection o f  the sword 
was to adopt the methods of Islam«.
93 Carro, op. cit., p. 275.
94 Pagden, European Encounters, p. 79, citing »Memorial de los remedios« (1542).
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legitimately rule themselves. In canonical tradition, there was a sharp division 
on this issue between Innocent IV, who maintained that by the laws common 
to all men, private property and self-government were the right of all men (pro 
omni rationabili creatura); and Hostiensis who asserted that »with the coming 
of the Christ every office and all governmental authority and all lordship and 
jurisdiction was taken from every infidel lawfully and with just cause and 
granted to the faithful through Him who has the supreme power and who 
cannot err«.95 The implications of the two positions are clear for the question: 
Was it or was it not licit to invade lands possessed by infidels and establish 
Christian rule over them? Hostiensis himself concluded that, »according to the 
law, the infidels have to be subjected to the faithful«.96
Las Casas chose to positively refer to Hostiensis. That was not an obvious 
choice. For it was rather in the tradition of Innocentian doctrine that Vitoria, 
and later Suarez, restrained the right of the Spaniards to make war against the 
Indians.97 While Hostiensis formulated an integralist theory of holy war, 
»opposing without mercy one religion to other religions«, and declared that 
war against infidels is always just;98 for Innocent and his followers, war 
against the unfaithful was just only under certain conditions.99 Nor was Las 
Casas' choice opportunistic: Hostiensis had been discredited more than a 
century ago.100 Yet it was nevertheless a good choice or, at least, one Las Casas 
knew how to make good. His comment that Hostiensis' opinion »does not 
apply indiscriminately to all infidels but to those only who existed in Hostiensis' 
own time«,101 let him have all he wanted: war and peace.
The paradox of Las Casas' legalism is that he had to find an extra-legal
95 »M ih i... videtur quod in adventu Christi omnis honor et omnis principatus et omne dominium 
et jurisdictio de jure, et ex causa justa, et per illuum qui supremam manum habet nec errare 
potest, omni infideli substrata fuerit et ad fideles translata.« Hostiensis, Lectura, quoted in 
Villey, op. cit., p. 31 (English translation in Muldoon, op. cit., p. 16). Generally on the subject: 
M uldoon,op. cit., Ch. 1; Russell,op. cit., especially p. 199sq.\Brundage, »Holy War«, pp. 121-
2 .
96 »Unde constanter asserimus, quod de jure infideles debent subjici fidelibus.« Hostiensis, I. c.
97 Cf. Villey, op. cit., p. 35.
98 Ibid., p. 32.
99 In case the Saracens »terras christianorum invasissent vel occupatas tenerent, vel christianos 
hostiliter impugnarent, tunc tarn per ecclesiam quam per principes ... potest eis justum bellum 
indici.« Innocent IV, Apparatus, cited ibid., p. 35. Cf. Russell, The Just War, pp. 199-200.
100 As a result o f the dispute between Paulus Vladimiri, speaking for the Polish King, and the 
Teutonic Knights in the council o f  Constance, »Hostiensis' views on dominium  were no longer 
acceptable«. Muldoon, op. cit., p. 119. Russell, »Paulus Vladimiri's Attack«, p. 253, has noted 
that the problems Paulus addressed -  the legitimacy o f infidel dominion and the just war -  
»would soon resurface with the European conquest o f America«.
lul Apologia, p. 194.
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existence for the Indians in order to be able to defend their peaceful treatment. 
His choice, and interpretation, of Hostiensis, »the father of the juridical theory 
of crusade«,102 was ingenious. His argument that Hostiensis' law was still in 
force with regard to the Muslims implied that the crusade was not passée, but 
that it did not apply to the Indians.
A further paradox lies in Las Casas' reference to the crusading tradition -  the 
materialization of an attitude towards the Muslims that was ultimately outside 
the realm of law. From the very beginning, there was a tension between canon 
law and the crusade: »So alien was the crusade ideology to the thinking of the 
canonists that it was not until the thirteenth century that it was incorporated 
into the canon law tradition of the just war.«103 The moment of that incorpora­
tion, personified in Hostiensis, was Las Casas' reference point. Yet the ques­
tion remains of how much the canon law had actually tamed »the fanaticism of 
the crusade« (only »distantly stirred by Augustine’s anti-Donatist writings«).104 
The »Turkish question«, the solution for which was the crusade, could not be 
wholly captured by law. It was the surplus that evaded legal codification, the 
imago Turci, that made it possible for Las Casas to preach war against the 
Muslims and peace for the Indians.
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